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’Good Nudge Lullaby’: Choice Architecture and Default Bias
Reinforcement∗
Thomas de Haan† Jona Linde‡
September 23, 2016
Short title: Choice Architecture and Default Bias Reinforcement
Abstract
Because people disproportionally follow defaults, both libertarian paternalists and mar-
keters try to present options they want to promote as the default. However, setting certain
defaults and thereby influencing current decisions, may also affect choices in later, similar
decisions. In this paper we explore experimentally whether the default bias can be reinforced
by providing good defaults. We show that people who faced better defaults in the past are
more likely to follow defaults than people who faced random defaults, hurting their later
performance. This malleability of the default bias explains certain marketing practices and
serves as an insight for libertarian paternalists.
Influencing people’s decisions is an important goal of both clever marketers and ambitious
policy makers. Because human behaviour is better characterised by bounded rationality than
by the full rationality assumed in traditional economic models, ’choice architects’, well-meaning
or self-interested, can increase the probability that their favoured option is chosen by influencing
the environment in which people make their decisions without changing incentives or prices (see
for example Thaler and Sunstein, 2003). One prominent tactic of both marketing executives
and so-called libertarian paternalists is to make an endorsed option the default choice, because
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many people disproportionally follow defaults (see e.g. Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988). In
this paper we study experimentally whether this ’default bias’ is affected by recent experiences
with defaults. Specifically we study whether people who were recently exposed to good defaults
are more likely to follow random defaults compared to people who faced random defaults. If
the nature of the choice architecture of recent choice situations affects subsequent behaviour
this could mean that techniques such as those proposed by libertarian paternalists can have a
’side effect’. It can also explain ways in which defaults are used in marketing.
Marketing executives are generally thought to set the option that yields the highest profit
as the default. However, research by Brown and Krishna (2004) and Campbell (2007) suggests
people deduce the quality of the default from their beliefs about the default setter and adjust
their behaviour accordingly, which reduces the effectiveness of such a policy. Therefore, it may
be more effective to first lull consumers into a false sense of security by setting defaults in their
best interest, only to follow up with profit maximizing defaults later on. Sellers can do this when
consumers repeatedly purchase from the same supplier and when a purchase requires several
separate decisions (e.g. buying a car, a computer, or a plane ticket), because in both cases
sellers can set many consecutive defaults.1 Indeed anecdotal evidence suggests that, when a
purchase requires several decisions, initial defaults are often better than the later ones: first you
are recommended economy class and direct routes, but later buying expensive flight insurance
or extra luggage allowance may well be the default option.
Libertarian or asymmetric paternalists (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003 and Camerer et al., 2003)
do not set defaults to further their own interests, but to help people make better decisions.2
Behavioural economic research shows that people can make decisions that go against their
own interest (e.g. Hoch & Loewenstein, 1991) and that their choices can be influenced by
features of the choice environment that are irrelevant according to standard rational choice
theory (see e.g. Kahneman & Tversky, 2000). Myopic time preferences (see for an overview
Frederick, Loewenstein & O’Donoghue, 2002) and framing (e.g. Tversky & Kahneman, 1981)
are well known examples of the first and the second type of behaviour respectively. Libertarian
or asymmetric paternalists therefore advocate designing the choice environment to promote
’better’ decisions without changing incentives. They propose to introduce ’nudges’, which steer
1Our experiment mainly focuses on situations where decision makers repeatedly face similar decisions. Levav
et al. (2010) provide an interesting investigation of settings where consumers have to take a series of decisions
to customise a product. They show, among other things, that consumers are more likely to follow the default if
earlier decision situations had more options and therefore presumably required more effort.
2In the remainder of this paper we use the term libertarian paternalism to refer to this approach.
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boundedly rational people towards better decisions without affecting people who are sufficiently
rational. Numerous studies validate the effectiveness of this approach (Thaler & Sunstein,
2003). Policy makers recently appear more and more open to the idea of nudging people as
evident from the establishment of the, now independent, “Behavioural Insights Team”3 by the
British government and similar teams in other countries. In a recent report the World Bank
(2015) commends the approach as a tool for economic development. Libertarian paternalism
has also sparked a lively media debate.4
Because the default bias is a common and well established behavioural bias (Samuelson
and Zeckhauser, 1988, Johnson and Goldstein, 2003, Madrian and Shea, 2001) setting a good
default is a prevalent nudge. However, if facing good defaults reinforces the default bias, this
type of nudge may have an unintended side effect if good defaults are followed by inferior ones.
One reason why that may happen is that for some decisions good defaults are easier to provide
than for others. This happens in one of the most prominent examples of libertarian paternalism:
default enrolment in pension plans (Madrian & Shea, 2001) to prevent under-saving due to time
inconsistency. Saving something, and therefore participating, is probably optimal for the large
majority of employees, but there is far more heterogeneity in how much people should ideally
save. Setting a ’good’ default savings rate is therefore far more difficult (Choi et al., 2003). As
a result the level of the default savings rate is probably a less helpful default than the default
to enrol and save at least something.
A second reason why libertarian paternalism can lead to good defaults followed by worse
ones is legal limitations. Courts may view libertarian paternalism as unwarranted government
intervention. In their book “Nudge” Thaler and Sunstein (2008) discuss a program implemented
in Maine (USA) to provide Medicare users with a good default health care program. Legal
challenges have contributed to the failure of this project to spread to other states. Similar legal
challenges may cause abandonment of libertarian paternalism programs already in place. If
that happens a person used to helpful defaults may face suboptimal (e.g. random) defaults in
the future. Lobbying efforts by affected companies or a change in the ideological nature of the
government can have similar effects.
The idea that facing good defaults increases the default bias assumes that the default bias
3http://www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk/, their blog chronicles numerous applications of behavioural paternal-
ism around the world.
4see e.g. http://www.economist.com/news/britain/21625871-behavioural-economics-changing-regulation-
payday-lending-target-nudge-nudge-think-think and http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/9d7d31a4-aea8-11e3-aaa6-
00144feab7de.html
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is not a constant tendency. Caplin and Martin (2013) show that many people indeed do not
blindly follow defaults, but consider whether a default is likely to help them or not. In their
experiment giving participants explicit information about how often the default equals the best
option strongly impacts participants’ default bias and the effort they put into making an active
decision.5 Experiments by Brown and Krishna (2004) and Campbell (2007), already referred to
above, show that people deduce the quality of the default from their beliefs about the default
setter. In this paper we examine a related issue: whether people also change their behaviour
based on recent experiences with a default. Given that the default bias is pliable it seems
plausible that earlier experiences may also affect the default bias, either through beliefs about
the quality of the defaults, as suggested by the findings mentioned in this paragraph, or through
some other mechanisms.
Whether facing good defaults indeed reinforces the default bias likely depends on what causes
the default bias in the first place. There are several explanations as to why people exhibit
a default bias. One possibility is that a preselected option simply attracts more attention
(see for example Caplin and Martin, 2013). A second possibility is based on loss aversion
(Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1991 and Kahneman and Miller, 1986). If the default is
treated as a reference point, people will compare other options to the default. Due to loss
aversion, dimensions on which the rival option is worse than the default get relatively more
weight than dimensions on which the rival option is better. A third possible reason why people
may be inclined to choose the default option is that a default option is perceived as advice.
Madrian and Shea (2001), for example, find that one cause for higher enrolment rates into a
pension plan when enrolment is the default is that people take the default as implicit advice from
their employer. A fourth possibility is that choosing the default is a choice heuristic (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1974). If making a choice is difficult, people are likely to use simple rules and
following the default is one possible rule. This could also be due to people trying to avoid the
mental cost of making a difficult decision (Anderson, 2003). Given a limited capacity to process
information the last two explanations are not necessarily biases, but possibly a boundedly
optimal way to make decisions.6
All of the possible explanations of the default bias mentioned in the previous paragraph allow
for an effect of an earlier helpful default on the default bias although they do not necessarily
5In their experiment this response is so strong that it may actually negate the positive effect of a good default.
6Nevertheless we will refer to people’s tendency to follow the default as the default bias.
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predict it. A default option may well draw more attention if it is associated with good outcomes.
If the default bias is driven by loss aversion, it is important that the agent’s reference point
coincides with the default. Facing good defaults for some time could possibly ensure this and
therefore establish a stronger default bias. The default is also more likely to be seen as advice
if it has proven to be good advice in the past. If the default bias is a choice heuristic, past
experiences can also affect how often people choose the default because successful heuristics
could be reinforced (Anufriev & Hommes, 2012). An individual who faced good defaults is
therefore more likely to use this heuristic, even if it is not a good heuristic now. Although in
this paper we do not distinguish between these possible explanations of the default bias we do
examine whether the default bias is affected by earlier experiences with defaults.
To test whether facing a good default reinforces the default bias we developed an experi-
mental task with an unequivocal best choice which is nevertheless hard to find. The task is
designed to resemble the type of task for which a nudge is likely to be useful: difficult and
hard to translate into easily understandable terms, and difficult to learn.7 Participants face this
task for 50 rounds. In the first 25 rounds participants in the ’good-default’ treatments receive
a nudge in the form of a good default, while participants in the ’random-default’ treatments
receive a random default. In the second 25 rounds both groups receive a random default. Any
difference in choices between participants in the good-default and random-default treatments
in these second 25 rounds reveals the effect of a good default on subsequent behaviour.
Our findings indeed suggest an increased reliance on the default for participants who faced
good defaults in the first 25 rounds. Although good-default participants immediately choose the
default at a lower rate in the rounds when the default becomes random, they keep choosing the
default about 10-20 percentage points more often than participants from the random treatment.
We also identify a significant negative effect on the quality of the decisions for good-default
treatment participants in the second half, however the choices in the first 25 rounds are much
better for the good-default participants due to the very good defaults they receive. In the next
section we describe the experimental design in detail. Section 2 presents the results of the
experiment and introduces a behavioural model to explain these results. Section 3 discusses an
extension to bad defaults and section 4 concludes.
7Thaler and Sunstein (2008, pp. 79-88) recommend these criteria to determine whether a nudge is warranted.
They also mention choices where benefits and costs are separated in time. For practical reasons this aspect does
not play a big role in our experiment, although participants do need to put effort into the task to perform well
and do not receive benefits from this until the end of the experiment.
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1 Design
The experiment was computerised with php/mysql and conducted at the CREED laboratory of
the University of Amsterdam. At the beginning of the experiment participants read the instruc-
tions on the computer at their own pace.8 They then received a summary of the instructions
on paper. After reading the instructions, participants had to correctly answer some questions
to test their understanding of the instructions.
All participants in the experiment performed the same set of 50 multi-attribute choice tasks.9
We implement a two-by-two design where one dimension is whether participants get feedback
on the value of their decision or not and the other dimension is a difference in the nature of the
default, either the best option (good-default treatments) or a random option (random-default
treatments), in the first half of the experiment. This results in four treatments: no-feedback
good-default, no-feedback random-default, feedback good-default, and feedback random-default.
Decisions in the second half, when all participants face the same task and the same, random,
default reveals the effect of being nudged by a good default on subsequent decisions. This effect
is the main focus of this paper. Comparing the size of this effect between treatments with and
without feedback allows us to explore in what kind of setting the nature of the default has a
larger effect on the default bias and further explore the cause of any difference between the
good-default and random-default treatments. Below we first discuss the choice task, then the
difference in the nature of the default in different treatments, and lastly the feedback participants
receive in the different treatments.
1.1 Task
Each round participants chose one option from a list of six. The information on which to base
this choice was presented in the form of a table. Each option consisted of a number of points in 6
categories, each with a different weight. The weights were 6, 5, 4, 3, 2 and -1. The category with
a weight of -1 was presented as the price of an option. Points in a category ranged from 0 to 399
for the price and from 0 to 49 for the other categories.10 The categories and their weights, but
not the points, were the same for each choice task. An option generated an amount of credits
equal to the sum of the points in each category multiplied by the weight of that category. The
8The instructions can be found in web appendix A.
9These tasks were presented in different orders, counterbalanced between treatments, see below for details.
10Participants were not informed about these ranges.
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tasks were randomly generated under the conditions that each option generated between 70 and
230 credits and that the best option generated at least 10 credits more than the second best
option. An example of a task is shown in figure 1 below.11
Figure 1: Example of the Choice Task as Presented to Participants
Remarks: Option 4 is the default option in this example.
A participant could select an option by clicking on the button in front of the option and
could change her selection as often as she wanted. The selected option was recorded as her
choice when she pressed the “make choice” button. A participant had 40 seconds in which
to make a choice. If these 40 seconds ran out the option that was selected at that time was
recorded as the participant’s choice.12 After a participant made her decision she had to wait
until the time alloted for this round expired before moving on to the next round. In addition
there was a 5 second waiting time between rounds. Participants were allowed to use pen and
paper but no calculator or other device that could calculate for them.
On top of the credits generated by the chosen option participants received a bonus, starting
at 20 credits and decreasing by 1 credit every two seconds the participant used to make a
decision. The diminishing bonus puts a small cost on spending more time on the task.13 We
implemented this bonus to ensure that a participant would enter his or her choice as soon as
(s)he had decided, which was desirable for two reasons. Firstly, in order to have a measure of
search effort in the form of time spent on the task. Secondly, to ensure that we know when
participants actively choose an option and when they were forced into a decision because time
ran out.
11This task can be seen as a choice between different products, each with a different price and different qualities.
The category weights represent the relative importance of different types of characteristics and the points the
quality of the product in that characteristic. In that sense the problem is similar to many everyday decision
problems, from buying a phone to choosing a medical insurance policy or an investment plan. This type of task
has previously been used by Kalayci and Potters (2011).
12This happened 325 times out of 8700 decisions, i.e. in 3.74% of all decisions.
13Even all 20 credits were a small amount compared to the gains that could be made by making a better
decision. For example the difference between the best and the second best option was always at least 10 credits
and the difference between the best and the worst option was on average 137 credits.
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Participants performed this task for 50 rounds in which all participants faced the same 50
tasks in 6 different orders. The order was counterbalanced between treatments.14 At the end
of the experiment one round was randomly selected.15 The number of credits earned in that
round determined the participant’s earnings. Each credit was worth 10 Euro cents.
The task we chose for this experiment has four advantages. First, it has an unambiguous
outcome measure in the value of the chosen option, while the value of the options is not easily
determined by participants. In fact our task is difficult in exactly the way decision situations
for which Thaler and Sunstein suggest people need a nudge are difficult: because it is a task
where people “have trouble translating aspects of the situation into terms that they can easily
understand” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 79), in this case difficulty translating points with a
weight into an aggregate value.16 Second, because each choice takes only 40 seconds participants
can perform relatively many tasks in a limited period of time. This allows for a substantial
number of tasks to be faced in which participants can become used to a certain kind of default
and a subsequent set of tasks to evaluate the effect of the earlier default.17 Third, because it is
a choice between options it naturally allows for the setting of a default. Fourth, because it is a
difficult task, a good default can be very useful for participants, which is likely to strengthen the
effect of having faced such a default. The combinations of these features results in a task that
is likely to reveal a substantial effect of facing good defaults on the default bias in subsequent
decision if such an effect exists. The difficulty increases the usefulness of a good default, but
also depresses performance in the random-default group. For that reason other types of tasks
may well reveal a larger effect of a stronger default bias on performance.
1.2 Default
In every round one of the six options in the table was given a different colour and was preselected
when participants were presented with the task (see option 4 in figure 1). This option was the
14The counterbalancing procedure also ensured that each group as a whole faced the same tasks in the first
and the second half of the experiment. Due to a small software error two participants had to be excluded, one in
the no-feedback good-default treatment and one in the no-feedback random-default treatment. This affected the
counterbalancing slightly, as these two participants had different orders. Leaving out two random participants
with these orders in the other treatments does not materially affect our results.
15The same round was selected for all participants in a session but because of the different task orders that
was a different task for different participants.
16We will present evidence about the difficulty of the task at the beginning of the results section, section 2.
17Thaler and Sunstein suggest that nudges are most important for tasks which are rare. Given the need for
repetition we cannot incorporate this feature in our experiment. However libertarian paternalism has also been
advocated, including by Thaler and Sunstein, for decisions which are repeated often, such as food choices in
cafeteria.
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default option. In the instructions it was labelled the recommended option without further
specifying why it was recommended. If participants did not select one of the other options, the
default automatically became the choice of the participant for that round if time ran out before
the participant selected an other option.18 If a participant did not chose the default option, a
smaller version of the table was shown, containing only the chosen and the default option. They
were then asked if they wanted to stay with their original choice or switch to the default.19
Participants were randomly assigned to a ’random-default’ or ’good-default’ treatment. Both
types of treatment were identical, except for the nature of the default option in the first half of
the experiment. In the random-default treatments, the default option was always determined
randomly for each task. In the good-default treatments, the default option for the tasks a
participant faced in the first 25 rounds of the experiment was the option with the highest value.
The tasks faced by participants in the good-default treatments in the rounds 26 to 50 had the
same random defaults as in the random-default treatments.20
These treatments are selected to maximise the impact of earlier defaults on the default bias
in an effort to explore whether such an effect can occur. This is why we have chosen a rather
extreme situation where participants face either perfect or purely random defaults. Very good
early defaults are most likely to enhance the default bias and random defaults will likely leave
a default bias unaffected in the random-default group or even decrease it. For the same reason
we provide participants with very little explicit information on the nature of the default. As a
result they only have their own experience to rely on, which we think increases the effect of that
experience. At the same time we believe our experimental design does provide an appropriate
model for the type of situation we intend to study. As in our experiment real world defaults
are also often either as good as possible, for example when they are set by a well-intentioned
choice architect or a marketer trying to increase the default bias of customers; or random, for
example if a choice architect does not consciously set a default. The lack of information about
the nature of the default is similarly realistic. People can of course try to deduce the nature of
the default from the default setter as Brown and Krishna (2004) and Campbell (2007) show,
but this is not always straightforward. Businesses may set genuinely good defaults in an effort
to stimulate consumer satisfaction and repeat purchases (Goldstein et al., 2008). Governments
18This happened only 87 times out of 8700 decisions, i.e. in 1% of all decisions.
19People switched a total of 246 times out of 6668, i.e. in only 3.7% of all initial non-default choices.
20The random default option was predetermined for each task, so participants who perform the same task
also have the same default option, except participants in the good-default treatments in the first half of the
experiment for whom the default option is the option with the highest value.
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have other goals than helping people make better decisions, as is evident in ’nudges’ which
aim for societal or environmental benefits rather than better individual decisions (e.g. Cabinet
Office Behavioural Insights Team, 2011). To model other situations or further examine the
way in which different kinds of defaults affect the default bias variations of our design could be
applied.
1.3 Feedback
The feedback participants receive during the experiment depends on the treatment. In the no-
feedback treatments participants receive no pay-off feedback until the end of the experiment,
when they learn the value of the option they chose in the round which is randomly selected
to determine their payout. Conversely, in the feedback treatments participants are shown the
value, in credits, of the option they chose plus separately the time bonus, immediately after each
round. Because there is a small waiting time between rounds, participants who only recorded a
choice when the decision time runs out also get a chance to see the value of their chosen option.
Thaler and Sunstein (2008, p.79) promote nudges especially for decisions “for which [people]
do not get prompt feedback”. Indeed in many decision situations for which a nudge has been
proposed important aspects of the value of a chosen option are unknown until far in the future.
For example, the health effects of food choices and future consumption possibilities resulting
from savings decisions usually do not become clear until many years later. In other cases where
nudges have been proposed there is some feedback about the value of a chosen option, but this
feedback is very noisy so it takes a lot of experience to learn the expected value of an option.
This is the case with, for example, insurance and investment decisions. In decision situations
with noisy and/or delayed feedback a decision maker faces many similar decisions before the
true value of a chosen option becomes clear. To model the effect of a good-default on subsequent
decisions in such situations it therefore seems most appropriate not to provide participants with
feedback about the quality of their decisions, as we do in the no-feedback treatments.
No-feedback is representative of most situations in which people are nudged, but it is less
representative of many situations where marketers set defaults, particularly for situations in
which you repeatedly purchase from the same supplier.21 If you bought the flight suggested by
21For purchase decisions which require several separate consecutive decisions (e.g. buying a plane ticket, a
computer, or a car) and therefore allow for consecutive defaults, it does hold that you do not receive feedback
about the quality of of your decision before facing later defaults. The same is true for defaults for commercial
products which have the same characteristics as the products for which nudges have been proposed, e.g. insurance.
10
a search engine, a car with the standard options, or a computer with default settings, you will
soon find out what the pay-off of your choice is. Our treatments with feedback more closely
resemble such situations.
Besides being representative of different types of situations in which people face defaults
in real life, comparing the effect of a good default on subsequent decisions in situations with
and without feedback may also reveal something about the reasons why earlier defaults affect
decisions. Assuming that having received a good defaults increases the default bias, a first
thing that might be revealed is whether the increased default bias is caused by either a conscious
decision to trust the default rather than rely on your own decisions, or a less conscious increased
attraction to the default option. A second thing that comparing treatments with and without
feedback can reveal is the interaction between the nature of the default and the quality of
decisions. In feedback treatments participants can evaluate the quality of their decisions.22 It is
possible that this reduces reliance on the default, perhaps only in the random-default treatment,
in which case it could lead to a stronger effect of having been nudged.
2 Results
A total of 174 participants participated in the experiment, 44 in both treatments with feedback
and 43 in both treatments without feedback.23 Eighty eight participants were male and 113
were economics or business students. On average the sessions lasted about an hour and the
average earnings were 19.25 Euro.
The results from the random-default treatments show that the task fulfils the criteria listed
in section 1.1: difficult but not impossible and with limited opportunities to learn how to select
a good option. In the random-default treatments participants on average chose an option with
a value of approximately 174, with or without feedback. That means they managed to realise
around 25% of the difference in expected value between picking a random option (155.75) and
always picking the best option (226.96). Without feedback we find no learning effect, but with
feedback there is some evidence for learning. A regression using data from the random-default
22Because participants only receive feedback about the value of the chosen option and not about the value of
the other options they cannot be sure whether they made a good or a bad decision, but the value of an option,
especially relative to the value of the chosen option in other rounds, does give an indication of the quality of a
decision.
23We aimed to recruit 50 participants per treatment, which we believe is a reasonable number for an individual
decision making experiment. Due to slightly lower than expected attendance the number of actual participants
is slightly lower.
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treatment with feedback of the value of the chosen option on the number of the round, with
task fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the individual level reveals that the round
has significant positive effect (p < 0.0001).24
To examine the effect of a good default on subsequent decisions we examine the behaviour
of participants in the second half of the experiment where participants in good-default and
random-default treatments face the same choice tasks and the same (random) defaults. We first
test whether receiving a nudge in the form of a good default increases the default bias. After
showing that this is indeed the case, we explore whether experiencing good defaults affects the
quality of subsequent decisions, either through an increased default bias, or for other reasons.
Lastly we present a behavioural model which captures the elements of our data that cannot be
explained by existing models. All reported non-parametric tests are two-sided and performed
at the individual level. Regressions use decisions as the unit of observation and cluster standard
errors by individual.
2.1 Default Bias
Our main hypothesis is that participants who have faced a good default in the past exhibit a
stronger default bias. As table 1 shows this was indeed the case for both the treatments with
and without feedback. In the second half of the experiment participants in the good-default
treatments were on average 11.6 and 18.2 percentage points more likely to pick the default
than participants in the random-default group in the treatments without and with feedback
respectively, even though they faced the exact same defaults. Furthermore, as figure 2 shows,
the stronger default bias for nudged participants persists throughout the second half of the
experiment.
Notice also the sharp decline of default choices for good-default participants after round 25.
This decline is especially rapid in the good-default treatment without feedback, from 70% in
round 25 to 36% in round 26 (Wilcoxon p= 0.0014) and from 73% in rounds 21-25 to 44% in
rounds 26-30 (Wilcoxon p < 0.0001). In the good-default treatment with feedback the decline
takes somewhat longer. The drop between rounds 25 and 26 is only 14% points, from 86% to
72% and not significant at conventional levels (Wilcoxon p= 0.1138). However it does drop
to 47% in round 27 (Wilcoxon p= 0.0164 compared to round 25). When comparing rounds
24Feedback random-default treatment participants did however start out picking a somewhat worse option than
no-feedback random-default treatment participants and actually perform somewhat worse in the first half of the
experiment en somewhat better in the second half, see table 2.
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21-25 to 26-30 the drop is very clear, from 82% to 56% (Wilcoxon p< 0.0001). Eventually the
decline in default choices for good-default participants is significantly larger with feedback than
without: comparing default choices in rounds 21-25 to those in rounds 41-50 we find a drop
from 73.2% to 49.3% without feedback and from 81.9% to 44.9% with feedback (Mann-Whitney
p= 0.0225).
Clearly participants in neither of the good-default treatments simply continue to choose the
default at the same rate as they did in the first half. This suggests that, although good-default
participants choose the default relatively more often than random-default group participants,
they do realise that the default option is not as good as it was in the first 25 rounds. Figure
3 supports this story at the individual level. The greater average reliance on the default is not
caused by a small number of good-default treatment participants who have learned to blindly
follow the default. Rather the whole distribution of default choices is shifted to the right
suggesting that having faced a good-default makes many participants somewhat more likely to
choose the default rather than some participants rely heavily on the default while leaving others
unaffected.
Table 1: Percentage of Default Choices in Each Half of the Experiment.
random-default good-default Mann-Whitney p
first half, no-feedback 30.0% 65.3% < 0.0001
first half, feedback 28.3% 73.0% < 0.0001
Mann-Whitney p 0.7944 0.0205
second half, no-feedback 33.9% 45.5% 0.0039
second half, feedback 26.3% 44.5% < 0.0001
Mann-Whitney p 0.0401 0.8781
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Figure 2: Average Proportion of Default Choices per 5 Round Intervals by Treatment
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Figure 3: Smoothed Density of Participants’ Tendency to Choose the Default Option in the
Second Half by Treatment
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The difference in the likelihood of default choices between treatments in the first half provides
further evidence that reinforcement of the default bias is a cause of the treatment effect. Even in
the random-default treatments participants chose the default more often than the 16.7% expec-
ted without a default bias (Wilcoxon p< 0.001), but good-default participants were significantly
14
more likely to do so (Mann-Whitney p< 0.001 in both random-default treatments). This in itself
does not provide evidence for a stronger default bias in the first half of the good-default treat-
ment. Participants may also have chosen the default more often in the good-default treatment
because it was the best option which they would have chosen anyway, regardless of it being the
default or not. However we find that in the first half participants in the good-default treatments
were more likely to choose the default than participants in the random-default treatments were
to choose either the default or the best option (65% vs. 57%, Mann-Whitney p= 0.0025 without
feedback and 73% vs. 53.8%, Mann-Whitney p < 0.0001 with feedback).
The linear probability regression reported in table 2 explores the difference between good-
default and random-default, and feedback and no-feeback treatments further. This regression
controls for task and round fixed effects, several demographic variables, high school maths level
and grade as a proxy of skill, and time used in the first round as a proxy of effort. As time
spent can be influenced by the treatment we take the time spent during the first round as an
exogenous proxy for effort.25 The regression confirms that having been exposed to good defaults
increases the likelihood of choosing the default. The presence of explicit feedback decreases the
likelihood of second half default choices but only significantly so for random-default-treatment
participants.26 The effect of having been nudged with good suggestions may be a little larger if
participants receive feedback, but this difference is far from significant. The regression further
shows that participants who take longer to make their decision choose the default less often, but
the interaction between time used in the first round and the good-default treatment indication
shows that such participants do not exhibit a significantly weaker treatment effect.
25Time spent in the first round strongly correlates with time spent in later rounds (Spearman correlation
coefficient is 0.3172 and p<0.001) Using time spent in the entire experiment or only the second half yields the
same qualitative results. Time used in the first round might have been influenced by the treatment (good-default
vs random-default) but a Mann-Whitney test shows that this is not the case (p= 0.5804 for the non-feedback
treatments and p= 0.1537 for the feedback treatments).
26A regression without the good-default-feedback interaction estimates a feedback coefficient of -.0474444 with
a p-value of 0.111, furthermore testing whether the sum of the feedback and good-default-feedback interaction
coefficient from the regression of table 2 is different from zero (using an F-test) gives a p-value of 0.6653).
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Table 2: Linear Probability Regression: Interaction Between Effort and the Treatment Effect
Dependent variable: choice equals the default option, second half only Coefficient p-value
good-default 0.133 (0.044) 0.003
feedback -0.076 (0.035) 0.030
good-default feedback interaction 0.056 (0.056) 0.319
time used in first rounda -0.003 (0.002) 0.032
good-default x time used in the first rounda -0.000 (0.003) 0.910
male -0.034 (0.030) 0.268
age 0.001 (0.000) 0.029
studies economics 0.027 (0.032) 0.409
Dutch 0.074 (0.036) 0.040
maths grade -0.002 (0.007) 0.814
maths level -0.022 (0.043) 0.614
Remarks: Standard errors used to calculate the p-values are clustered at the individual level. Task and round fixed effects
are included in addition to the controls listed in the table. We also included a dummy variable for 11 participants who did
not state their age and/or gender, so their choices could be included in the regression. The coefficients for gender and age
are relevant for the other participants who did state their age and/or gender. Standard errors are between brackets. aThe
variable ’time used in the first round’ was normalised to have mean zero before interacting it with the treatment dummy
to facilitate interpretation of the coefficient on the uninteracted treatment dummy.
Figure 2 also shows that the tendency to choose the default increases for good-default
participants during the first 25 rounds, from an average of 57% (58%) default choices in the
first five rounds, to 73% (82%) default choices in rounds 21-25 for the good-default treatment
without (with) feedback. Linear regressions with task fixed effects confirm this positive trend
both with and without feedback (p<0.001). A linear regression using data from good-default
treatments with and without feedback including an interaction between feedback and rounds
reveals that the trend is somewhat stronger with feedback (p= 0.026). Without feedback there
is no significant trend for random-default group participants in the first half. With feedback
random-default group participants did become significantly less likely to choose the default in
the first half of the experiment (p= 0.005). This negative trend is also present in the feedback-
good-default treatment in the second half of the experiment (p= 0.001). No other treatment
exhibits a trend in the second half of the experiment. We therefore conclude that good-default
participants’ default bias was reinforced during the first half of the experiment, both with and
without the presence of feedback. Feedback participants who receive random defaults do slightly
reduce their default bias, also if they have received good defaults before. However, a significant
default bias remains and the increase in the default bias caused by having received good defaults
does not disappear.
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2.2 Performance
Nudging participants with good defaults clearly reinforces their default bias but does this also
hurt their performance in this experimental task? To answer this question we use the value
of the chosen option as a performance measure. Table 3 shows that in the second half of the
experiment, when all participants faced the same random defaults, participants in the random-
default treatments chose a better option than those in the good-default treatments, independent
of whether they received feedback or not. In the treatments without feedback the difference is
5.7 points, or just over 1/3 of a standard deviation; with feedback the difference is 8.8 points,
or about 2/3 of a standard deviation. This means that whereas random-default participants
managed to realise 28.8% of the difference in expected value between picking a random op-
tion and picking the best option without feedback and 30% with feedback, participants in the
good-default treatment realised only 18.7% of this difference without feedback and 17.6% with
feedback. By this measure good-default participants performed 29.9% worse without feedback
and 41.2% worse with feedback. As table 3 shows this difference is strongly significant with
feedback and marginally significant without.27
The regression in table 4 below, which pools the data from all four treatments, confirms
the treatment effect on performance. This regression controls for round and task fixed effects,
several demographic variables, high school maths level and grade as a proxy of skill, and time
used in the first round as a proxy of effort. Controlling for these variables in the regression, the
treatment effect of the default becomes significant at a 5% level in the no-feedback treatment.
The effect of the default may be somewhat larger in the feedback treatment, but, as with the
treatment effect on default choice, the difference is far from significant.28
27Despite signs of hurting performance when the good default disappears in the second half, there is a strong
direct effect of the good first half defaults on performance in the first half where good-default participants realise
50.2% and 55.3% of the difference in expected value between picking a random option and always picking the best
option without and with feedback respectively. As table 3 shows this is significantly better than the performance
of the random-default treatments.
28As can be seen in table 4, we find an unhypothesised, but significant gender effect. However, including an
interaction term between gender and treatment in the regression of table 4 shows that the treatment effect is not
significantly different for men and women (p= 0.578).
17
Table 3: Average Value of the Chosen Options
random-default Treatment good-default Treatment Mann-Whitney p
first half, no feedback 173.0 (14.1) 191.5 (11.6) 0.0000
first half, feedback 170.0 (9.7) 195.1 (13.6) 0.0000
Mann-Whitney p 0.0739 0.0618
second half, no feedback 174.8 (15.1) 169.1 (17.5) 0.081
second half, feedback 177.1 (9.0) 168.3 (12.4) 0.0008
Mann-Whitney p 0.9898 0.3043
Remarks: Standard deviations reported between brackets.
Table 4: Regression: Treatment Effect on Performance
Dependent variable: value of the chosen
Coefficient p-value
option in the second half of the experiment
good-default -6.528 (3.035) 0.033
feedback 3.407 (2.530) 0.180
good-default feedback interaction -2.167 (3.815) 0.571
time used in first rounda 0.370 (0.129) 0.005
good-default x time used in the first rounda -0.022 (0.182) 0.902
male 7.090 (2.047) 0.001
age 0.014 (0.018) 0.455
studies economics or business 0.018 (2.110) 0.993
Dutch -3.187 (2.458) 0.196
maths grade 0.065 (0.497) 0.896
maths level 2.164 (2.626) 0.411
Remarks: Standard errors used to calculate the p-values are clustered at the individual level. Task and round fixed effects
are included in addition to the controls listed in the table. We also included a dummy variable for 11 participants who did
not state their age and/or gender, so their choices could be included in the regression. The coefficients for gender and age
are relevant for the other participants who did state their age and/or gender. Standard errors are between brackets. aThe
variable ’time used in the first round’ was normalised to have mean zero before interacting it with the treatment dummy
to facilitate interpretation of the coefficient on the uninteracted treatment dummy.
The regression in table 4 shows that our proxy for effort, time used in the first round,
predicts participants’ performance in the second half. At the same time it might be the case
that experiencing a good default, or the higher expected earnings it brings, affects the time
and/or effort required to make decisions or participants’ willingness to spend time and effort
on the task, and perhaps through that channel performance and/or their inclination to choose
the default.29 This effect could run in both directions. The fact that participants in the good-
default treatment got used to helpful defaults and high (expected) earnings could have made
them unwilling to expand effort later on, or prevented them from learning how to make a good
decision themselves.30 However, Abeler et al. (2011) show that the effect could also run in the
29Caplin and Martin (2013) find that participants who know they face better defaults indeed spend less time
to make a decision.
30Carlin et al.’s (2013) model shows this reduced incentive to learn can also hurt others when acquired knowledge
can spread through the population.
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opposite direction. In their experiment participants were either paid a predetermined amount,
or their earnings from a task. They found that participants for whom the predetermined
amount was higher spent more effort on the task, presumably to prevent the disappointment
from getting a lower amount when the task is paid out. Because only one round is paid out in
our experiment these results suggests that higher earnings if a round from the first half is paid
out should lead to increased effort in the second half. As good-default participants chose better
options in the first half this should increase their effort in the second half. We therefore study
the time participants took to make decisions during the second half of the experiment.
Without feedback participants in the good-default treatment spend on average slightly less
time in the second half of the experiment than participants in the random-default treatment:
18.3 versus 19.1 seconds. Without feedback time spend was similar with good or random
defaults: 14.5 seconds versus 14.7 seconds. Both of these differences are far from significant
(Mann-Whitney test p= 0.81 for the no-feedback treatments and p= 0.77 for the feedback
treatments). Given that we find no treatment effect on our proxy of effort we do not think a
difference in effort drives our results. Furthermore, the findings of Abeler et al. suggest that
more effort by good-default participants is also a likely scenario, which would mean that if there
is a treatment effect on effort our results would be a conservative estimate.
Effort might however interact with the treatment effect in another way. If participants who
put more effort into the task are more likely to make their own choice and ignore the default,
we would expect the treatment to affect them less. If that is the case the treatment effect on
the likelihood of default choices would be significantly smaller for this group. However, tables 2
and 4 show that this is not the case. The interaction effect of the treatment with our measure of
effort inclination, time taken in the first round, has no significant effect on either the likelihood
to choose the default or on the performance in the second half of the experiment.
2.3 Behavioural Model
If we roughly summarise the choice behaviour of the participants in our experiment, we observe
the following main patterns:
1. Less than optimal, but better than random choices.
2. A clear and persistent tendency to choose the default over other options even in the
random-default treatment where the default is random.
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3. This default bias reduces over the course of the experiment when random-default group
participants receive feedback, but not when there is no feedback.
4. Participants in the good-default treatment come to choose the default more and more often
during the first 25 rounds, even when they do not receive explicit feedback regarding the
value of the chosen option, which they could use to learn that the default is a good choice.
5. This increase in the default bias for good-default participants is stronger with feedback.
6. There is a sharp drop in default choices after round 25 for the good-default treatments
with and without feedback.
7. This drop is less fast, but eventually larger, with than without feedback.
8. Despite this drop good-default participants show a substantially higher default bias in
the second half than the random-default group in both the no-feedback and feedback
treatments, which is the main result of the experiment.
In this section we present a behavioural model that can capture all these patterns in the data: a
noisy response model combined with an effect we call “choice reinforcement” and the possibility
for reinforcement learning (see e.g. Erev and Roth, 1998). Choice reinforcement here means
that the attraction of an option increases after one has chosen it and decreases when one has
not chosen it.31 Besides such choice reinforcement participants’ choices can also be affected by
a more explicit learning process about the relative value of default and non-default options.
We model this by reinforcement learning. The main idea of reinforcement learning is that
participants’ expectations of (only) the values of chosen options are updated, based on the
experienced pay-off. In the feedback treatments participants receive explicit feedback about the
value of their chosen option, so reinforcement learning is more plausible in those treatments.
For this reason the model only incorporates reinforcement learning in those treatments. In
contrast to reinforcement learning, choice reinforcement does not need any specific performance
feedback so the model allows for this effect to occur in all treatments.
We want to mention here that although the model only incorporates reinforcement learning
in the treatments with feedback, we do not mean to imply that there is potentially no learning
happening in the no feedback treatment. The acquaintance with the task could help participants
31One way to see the reinforcement is that people remember and value their own past evaluation effort that
has led to previous choices.
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recognise over time how high-valued options look like. Even when participants are not able to
check their chosen score via explicit feedback, they might still be able to figure this out by
their own estimation. This ’learning without explicit feedback’ could possibly resemble the
structure of reinforcement learning, as the option a participant chose might very well be the
option the participant studied most closely. However, the effect is likely to be (far) weaker
without explicit feedback and later in this section we will present some results which indeed
suggest that choice dynamics following a reinforcement-learning pattern are hardly present in
the no-feedback treatments. Nevertheless it is important to consider this when interpreting the
parameters of the model because the choice reinforcement part of the model may capture the
reinforcement learning that does occur in the no-feedback treatments and as a consequence the
model may underestimate the importance of reinforcement learning.
The model works as follows: Each round for each participant the probability that an option
i is chosen is given by:
P (option i is chosen) =
αi · eλ·(pii+1option i is the default·(piRd −piR¬d))∑6
j=1 αj · eλ·(pij+1option j is the default·(pi
R
d
−piR¬d))
Here λ is the rationality parameter and pii is the value of option i. Choice reinforcement is
incorporated into the model via the α-parameters. αi is the attraction that an option has for a
participant in a given round. In every round and for every participant
∑6
i αi = 1, so that αi can
be seen as the weight, or attention that an option gets in a participants’ choice deliberation.
We distinguish only between default and non-default choices. So, for example, if option i is
the default in one round and αi has a value of
1
3 , all other αj ’s will have a value of
1− 1
3
5 =
2
15 .
The choice reinforcement of the default in this model is based on participants´ past choices in
the following way. After a default choice the default attraction becomes: αd,t+1 = α
δ
d,t. where
δ ≤ 1 is the reinforcement parameter. The attraction parameters for the non-default choices
in round t + 1 are set at αj 6=d,t+1 =
1−αd,t+1
5 . If a non-default choice i is made in round t,
αd,t+1 = αd,t · 1−α
δ
j 6=d,t
1−αj 6=d,t and (again) αj 6=d,t+1 =
1−αd,t+1
5 . So, in case of a non-default choice, first
the attraction of a not chosen default option is decreased as if the attraction of one of the non-
default choices was choice-reinforced, which would have resulted in multiplying the attraction
of each not-chosen option by
1−αδj 6=d,t
1−αj 6=d,t . In this case only the attraction of the default option
is multiplied by
1−αδj 6=d,t
1−αj 6=d,t . Then subsequently, because we only distinguish between the default
option and the non-default options, all non-default attractions are set equal to
1−αd,t+1
5 such that
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again
∑6
i αi = 1. The consequence of this updating mechanism is that after one default choice,
the default reinforcement is usually stronger than the de-inforcement of the default attraction
after one non-default choice. A picture of how the value of αd,t changes from one round to the
next is given in figure 4.32 To allow for an inherent default bias the initial attraction of the
default, αd,1, is the third free parameter.
Figure 4: Attraction Parameter Dynamics
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As explained above the model incorporates reinforcement learning in addition to the choice
reinforcement, but only in the feedback treatments where participants receive explicit feedback
on the value of their chosen option. We use a simple implementation of reinforcement learning,
so we can have a single model that would predict participants’ choices both for the treatments
with and without feedback. The main intuition of this implementation is that via the pay-off
feedback piRd , the reinforcement learning estimated average value of choosing a default option,
and piR¬d, the reinforcement learning estimated average value of choosing a non-default option,
are updated. In the first round piRd =pi
R
¬d = pi1 so there is no inherent “conscious” belief that
the default option has a higher value.33 For the treatments with feedback, each round, the
values are updated as follows. After a default choice piRd,t+1 = γ · pichosen option,t + (1− γ) · piRd,t
and piR¬d,t+1 = pi
R
¬d,t. After a no-default choice pi
R
¬d,t+1 = γ · pichosen option,t + (1− γ) · piR¬d,tand
piRd,t+1 = pi
R
d,t. The parameter γ reflects the intensity of the reinforcement learning. As stated in
the no-feedback treatments, piRd and pi
R
¬d are not updated as participants were given no explicit
32The figure is based on a value of δ equal to 0.9537. This is a value we estimated based on the participant’s
choice data. See below for more on our estimation procedure.
33Although such initial default bias could exist, this would be the same in the feedback and no-feedback
treatments, so we capture it with the αd,1 parameter.
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information on the pay-off of their chosen option. This means piRd − piR¬d will always be equal
to 0 for the no feedback treatments. We end up with one model that, for given parameters λ,
αd,1, δ, γ, and pi1, makes choice predictions.
Table 5: Maximum Likelihood Estimation
full model Std Noisy Response Without choice reinforcement Without reinforcement learning
λˆ 1.4714(0.0275) 1.6358(0.0260) 1.4370(0.0270) 1.5773(0.0287)
αˆd,1 0.2958(0.0086) 0.167
∗ 0.4139(0.0085) 0.2891(0.0079)
δˆ 0.9537(0.0025) 1∗ 1∗ 0.9455(0.0023)
γˆ 0.3044(0.0306) 0∗ 0.1241(0.0135) 0∗
pˆi1 98.37(10.70) −−∗ 28.67(9.71) −−∗
log L −11616 −13367 −11800 −11666
Remarks: Std errors are in brackets. Parameter values denoted with * are not estimated, but fixed due to model restrictions. For the
estimation we divided all option point totals by 100.
Table 5 shows the parameter estimates and log likelihoods of a maximum likelihood estim-
ation of the five parameters on the data of our experiment. We estimate one model on the
combined data of all four treatments. In addition to our full model we present three other
models with different restrictions on the estimated parameters. First, because the model we
present here is based on the well known logit choice model developed by McFadden (1973)34 we
compare our model to that model. Second, to separate the effect of introducing a default bias
per se and allowing the default bias to be reinforced we also present a logit noisy choice model
without choice reinforcement. Third, to look at the impact of reinforcement learning we estim-
ate a model without the possibility of reinforcement learning. Again, the model’s reinforcement
learning only has an influence for the part of the observations coming from the treatments with
feedback.
All four models estimate a fairly similar rationality parameter, λ. Both the constant and
the reinforced default bias models reflect the substantial (initial) default bias observed in both
treatments with an estimate of αd,1 that is well above
1
6 , but substantially higher if we do not
allow for choice reinforcement. The choice reinforcement parameter δ is estimated at a level
below 1, which indicates positive choice reinforcement. The estimation also gives a positive
value for the reinforcement learning intensity parameter γ. Looking at the log-likelihood values
of the different models, we see that setting the choice reinforcement parameter δ equal to one
has a substantial impact on the likelihood score. This impact is larger than that of setting the
reinforcement learning parameter γ equal to zero. The estimation of pi1 is lower than the average
value of a (random) option (156). One explanation for this is that a low value of pi1 produces
34McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), among others, use this model.
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an effect that is similar to what the choice reinforcement is doing. With a low value of pi1
participants, in the feedback-good-default treatment, who do not often choose the non-default
option, and hence not often update piR¬d, will have a relatively low reinforced expectation of (pi
R
¬d)
by round 25, compared to participants in the feedback-random-default treatment. This will lead
to the model producing our main effect of more default choices for good-default participants,
on top of the effect of choice reinforcement. We indeed see that in the model without choice
reinforcement (when δ ≡ 1), the estimated value of pi1 is even lower, as a low value of pi1 has
now become the only way for the model to produce the second half default choices effect. We
estimate the value of pi1 in this model together with the choice reinforcement part that brings
along the term αd,1, the initial default bias. This allows us to estimate one model for both
the feedback and no-feedback treatments but makes a direct interpretation of the estimated
value of pi1 difficult. The reinforcement learning model needs a starting parameter pi1 and
our main assumption here is that both the initial reinforcement learning valuation of default
and no-default are equal and otherwise we allow this to be a free parameter of the model.
Importantly, per construction of the model, this reinforcement learning feature of the model
based on explicit pay-off feedback for the chosen option, cannot explain our main treatment
difference in the second half default choice in the case of no feedback. Our proposed mechanism
of choice reinforcement is crucial for the model to produce our main treatment effect both
in the feedback and no-feedback treatments. All in all our model estimations suggest that
choice reinforcement can explain a good part of the choice pattern for both the no-feedback
and feedback treatments. However the addition of a simple reinforcement learning mechanism
does help to capture the differences between the data patterns of the no-feedback and feedback
treatments.
The model assumes that reinforcement learning is absent without feedback. If we do allow for
reinforcement learning (also) in the no-feedback treatments, by adding a separate γno−feedback
parameter to the model, the maximum likelihood optimization estimates this parameter to be
equal to 0.0072 (with an estimated standard deviation of 0.0032) which is very small compared
to the γ estimated for the feedback treatments.35 This suggests that there is indeed little
reinforcement learning going on in the no-feedback treatments and validates not including it in
the model. Nevertheless, strictly speaking, the difference between the no-feedback and feedback
35Including this parameter to the model also adds very little in terms of explanatory power, yielding a log
likelihood of -11613 compared to -11616 in the original model.
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treatments and the effect of reinforcement learning in the model and simulations could best
be interpreted as the result of the additional reinforcement learning that occurs as a result of
participants receiving explicit pay-off feedback about the chosen option.
Figure 5: Simulations and Data of Default Choices
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Figure 5 shows the percentage of default choices in five round intervals predicted by the
model in 1000 simulations using the estimated parameters compared to the actual choice data.
The top graph shows the simulation and the actual data for the no-feedback treatments and
the bottom graph shows the simulation and data for the feedback treatments. Note that the
simulations for treatments with and without feedback treatments are based on the same para-
meters. The only difference in the simulations between feedback and no-feedback is that the
estimated parameters γˆ and pˆi1 have no influence in the simulation of choices without feedback.
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The simulations capture the qualitative features of the choice behaviour in all four treatments.
Most importantly they capture the steady rise of default choices in the first half for good-default
participants, and the main experimental result that the share of default choices in the last 25
rounds is higher in the good-default treatments than in the random-default treatments. As can
be seen, the choice reinforcement model increases the attraction of the default option in the
first 25 rounds in the good-default treatment, because it is chosen relatively often as it is a good
option. This in turn increases the relative chance that a default option is chosen, also in the
second half.36
As mentioned, allowing the model to use reinforcement learning in the treatment with
feedback, but not in those without, allows the model to capture the qualitative differences
between these treatments. Firstly, adding reinforcement learning reduces the share of default
choices in the simulation of the feedback random-default treatment. The choice reinforcement
element in the model, combined with the relatively high initial default bias αd,1 causes the
default option to be chosen ´too often´ in the random-default treatments. Given this, the
pay-off from a chosen default option will typically be lower than the pay-off from a chosen non-
default choice in any round. In a treatment with feedback, the choice model with reinforcement
learning will consequently update piRd to be lower than pi
R
¬d, lowering the likelihood of a default
choice. Secondly, adding feedback and reinforcement learning will cause someone who chooses
along the lines of the behavioural model to choose the default more often in the first half of the
good-default treatment. As the default option is always the highest, piRd will quickly update to
a high level, which increases the default choice likelihood, on top of the choice reinforcement
effect. Thirdly, in the second half of the experiment, when the value of the default option
is random, the high value of piRd will initially lead to more default choices with than without
feedback explaining the slower drop in default choices. However, the high default choice rate for
good-default decision makers with feedback will cause piRd to decrease, leading to an additional
decrease in the second half default choice likelihood for good-default participants with feedback.
In this way the model can reproduce the slower and in the end larger second half drop in default
choices with feedback.
36A crucial feature of the model which allows for the drop in the share of default choices for the good-default
group after round 25 is that a given level of skewness in the α’s only has a real impact on choices when the
differences in the actual pay-offs of the options are not too large and λ is not too large. So here attraction
differences play a role when the decision maker is “confused” enough (of course if the α´s are skewed enough to
one option this can still determine the choice probabilities for a given large value of λ and pii´s). This feature
allows us to replicate the pattern in the data that when a default in some round has a very low pay-off, very few
will choose the option, even when someone has very much reinforced the attraction level α for the default.
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3 Extension to Bad Defaults
Our analysis so far has focused on the effect of good defaults on subsequent decisions. Good
defaults are the most relevant case because one, good defaults are a common ’nudge’ and two,
good defaults are the most plausible default to use when someone, e.g. a marketer, wants to
induce people to follow their defaults. However, the effect of earlier defaults on subsequent
decisions and the theory we used to explain this effect should in principle apply equally to other
defaults. A conspicuous case is one with initial bad defaults. Can bad defaults perhaps ’debias’
people, reducing their default bias in subsequent decisions?37 As figure 6 shows our model,
with the estimated parameters (based on the other treatments) predicts that the answer is yes.
To explore this possibility we conducted an additional ’bad-defaults’ treatment where in the
first half of the experiment the default option was always the worst possible choice. We chose
to conduct this treatment without feedback so the results of this treatment are best compared
with the results from the no-feedback treatments.
Forty nine participants took part in this treatment, of which 25 were males and 37 were
economics or business students. As with the main treatments we again look at decisions in the
second half where participants in the bad-default and random-default treatments face the same,
random defaults. Figure 6 and tables 6 and 7 show we did not find the predicted debiasing effect,
neither on default choices, nor on performance. It is not that participants did not notice that
defaults were bad in the first half, they only choose the default option 10.9% of the time much
less than in the random-default treatment (p< 0.0001). However, we find no effect on their
subsequent decisions. We also do not find evidence for a reduction in the default bias during
the first half of the experiment (a linear probability regressions with task fixed effects reveals
no significant trend in default choices during the first half p= 0.339). Thus, we find evidence
that it is possible to increase people’s default bias by presenting them with good defaults, but
somewhat against our expectations not that it is possible to reduce their default bias with
bad-defaults.38
37Random defaults might already have had this effect, but we did not observe this without feedback, and only
weakly with feedback.
38Our behavioural model would predict a debiasing effect of first half bad-defaults on second half default
choices. However, the model would predict this effect to be smaller than the positive effect of good first half
defaults on the choice frequency of second half defaults.
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Figure 6: Simulations and Data on Default Choice No-feedback Treatments and Bad-default
Treatment
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Table 6: Percentage Default Choices No-feedback Treatments
first half, no feedback second half, no feedback
random-default treatment 30.0% 33.9%
good-default treatment 65.3% 45.5%
bad-default treatment 10.9% 31.35%
Mann-Whitney p
random-default vs good-default 0.0000 0.0039
random-default vs bad-default 0.0000 0.2323
good-default vs bad-default 0.0000 0.0003
Table 7: Average Value of the Chosen Option No-feedback Treatments
first half, no feedback second half, no feedback
random-default treatment 173.0 (14.1) 174.8 (15.1)
good-default treatment 191.5 (11.6) 169.1 (17.5)
bad-default treatment 170.6 (17.7) 175.7 (12.8)
Mann-Whitney p
random-default vs good-default 0.0000 0.0811
random-default vs bad-default 0.9540 0.9051
good-default vs bad-default 0.0000 0.0755
Remarks: Standard deviations reported between brackets.
4 Conclusion
The default bias is one of the most well known and consistently observed behavioural biases. It
is also a bias that is often used to influence behaviour, either to help the decision maker (e.g.
with libertarian paternalism) or to benefit the person who sets the default (e.g. in marketing).
In this study we investigated whether the default bias itself is affected by the nature of earlier
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defaults. We find that providing participants with good defaults reinforces their default bias.
Compared to participants who always faced random defaults, participants who faced a good
default in the first half of the experiment choose the default option significantly more often in
the second half were all participants face random defaults. As a result good-default participants
performed somewhat worse in the second half.39 We found this effect both when participants
received feedback on the quality of their decisions and when they did not receive any feedback.
However, with-feedback participants showed a stronger increase in the tendency to choose the
default option when facing good defaults, and a slower, but eventually larger, decrease in default
choices when defaults became random.
To explain our results we developed a model, which combines choice reinforcement, a tend-
ency to make similar choices as in the past, and reinforcement learning, updating beliefs about
the quality of default and non-default options based on past experience, which is more plausible
when receiving feedback. The model organises our results quite well, including the observed
differences between feedback and no-feedback treatments.
Existing research has studied debiasing decisions (see Larrick, 2004 for a review) but the
results presented in this paper suggest that we can also, intentionally or not, strengthen existing
biases.40 However, our model does suggest that debiasing people should also be possible: if
people face bad defaults their default bias is predicted to decline. Interestingly results from an
additional treatment where participants face bad-defaults before facing random defaults, shows
no evidence that this works. In the second half of the experiment where all participants face
random defaults, these bad-default participants do not choose the default any less often than
people who have always faced random defaults. The result suggests that the presented model
does not fully capture the cognitive processes which drive our results. A closer look at the
cognitive processes and the development of beliefs about the default provide interesting avenues
for future research. We believe the results of the bad-default treatment are also interesting in
themselves, especially from the perspective of marketing, where consumers are more likely to
be confronted with bad defaults.
We conclude from our results that the default bias is not a fixed tendency, but something
39This effect on performance is not as strong as the effect on the default bias, which is not surprising as our
experiment was not designed to maximise this effects. Other tasks may well reveal a larger, smaller, or even
positive effect on performance depending on, for example, the difficulty of the task and the exact nature of the
later default.
40Although he does not consider the effect of a nudge on later decisions Larrick (2004) strikingly calls the
libertarian paternalism method of debiasing rebiasing.
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that can be manipulated and, apparently can be increased more easily than that it can be
decreased. While this is a single experiment and further studies should assess the robustness
of this phenomenon, we do believe this conclusion provides a note of caution to policy makers
attempting to improve decisions using a nudge. When implementing a policy it is important
to consider possible changes to the policy in the future and the effect a policy has on the way
people take decisions, even decisions you do not intend to affect.
Nevertheless we certainly do not argue that policy makers should never engage in liber-
tarian paternalism. In fact our experiment showed that the good default we provided helped
participants to make better decisions overall.41 We do believe that our results, especially when
taken together with the findings of Brown and Krishna (2004), Campbell (2007), and Caplin
and Martin (2013), lend support to the idea of announcing how, to which end and by whom
the choice architecture in a particular situation is designed.42,43
Another important avenue for future research would be to see if reinforcement of default
choices in one choice context could spill over and increase the likelihood of people following
defaults or recommended choices in other choice environments. This can be especially relevant
in the case of a government actively setting defaults in many choice settings. Our experiment
does not address this issue but focuses on establishing the default bias reinforcement result for
repeated choice contexts. However, research in the field of behavioural and learning spillovers
suggests that such spillovers to other choice environments are not unlikely, because people do,
under certain circumstances, take beliefs or even actions learned or reinforced in one strategic
context and apply them in another strategic choice environment (see e.g. Grimm and Mengel
2012, Bednar et al. 2012, or Huck et al. 2011). However, Cooper and Kagel (2008) show
an example where people with experience in one environment actually change their strategy
quicker towards equilibrium in a subsequent different game.
In light of our results and these related findings we believe that recognizing the effects of
a designed choice architecture on subsequent decisions should be considered when designing
public policies and might also provide grounds to regulate certain marketing practices. Future
(field) experiments on libertarian paternalistic policies can shed further light on the effect of
41For a more philosophical discussion on the merits of and objections to libertarian paternalism, which we do
not enter in this paper, see e.g. Sunstein and Thaler (2003), Mitchell (2004) and Sugden (2008).
42Although Caplin & Martin show that providing such information can also backfire as they show people can
rely on the default too much if it is a good, but not perfect, default.
43In light of this the transparency of the British “Behavioural Insights Team”
(http://www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk/) about their interventions and the media attention they receive is
a laudable example, although they do not directly inform people subjected to certain interventions.
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having been nudged with good suggestions by also examining decisions the researchers do not
intend to influence, but which could be affected by the choice architecture of earlier decisions.
Norwegian School of Economics, Bergen
Maastricht University
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